Greenland, Geopolitics and the Future of UK–US Intelligence
- Ken Kirwan
- 3 days ago
- 4 min read
I joined policing in 1990. Back then, intelligence sharing was slower, more personal, and often built on who you knew and trusted. Over the years, I’ve seen that change completely. Intelligence today moves instantly across borders. Data, watchlists, biometrics, travel alerts — they all sit inside systems that depend on trust, law, and political stability.
When the UK left the European Union, I was involved in work connected to the International Crime Coordination Centre (ICCC). One of the biggest concerns at the time was simple: how do we keep intelligence flowing once we are no longer fully embedded in EU systems linked to Schengen arrangements? We managed it, but it took negotiation, legal work, and careful rebuilding of access routes.
Now, in 2026, a different question is emerging. What happens if the wider political relationship between Europe and the United States becomes strained?
At the Munich Security Conference in February 2026, Germany’s Chancellor warned that the “rules-based world order no longer exists.” The BBC reported clear signs of tension between Europe and the U.S., particularly following statements from the Trump administration questioning traditional alliances and burden-sharing.
At the same time, the U.S. Trump administration has openly discussed the possibility of acquiring Greenland — a territory owned by Denmark, a NATO ally. While some may see this as rhetoric, the fact that military and strategic interests were mentioned has caused concern across Europe. Greenland sits in a highly strategic Arctic position. Any move to assert control there would not just be symbolic — it would be geopolitical. For the UK, this creates a difficult space.
Why this matters for intelligence sharing
The UK’s intelligence relationship with the United States, particularly through the Five Eyes alliance, is one of the strongest in the world. Counter-terrorism cooperation, cyber threat intelligence, organised crime disruption — all of these rely on deep trust and open exchange.
But intelligence sharing does not exist in a vacuum. It sits within political relationships.
If the U.S. were to take steps that significantly strain relations with European allies — for example, moving assertively toward occupying or controlling Greenland — the UK could find itself under diplomatic pressure. We are historically close to Washington. We are geographically and politically tied to Europe. Being forced to take sides in a dispute involving NATO allies could place the UK in a very uncomfortable position.
And when political tension rises, intelligence sharing can become more cautious.
Not necessarily because professionals want it to be — but because governments reassess risk, access, and alignment.
Lessons from Brexit and Schengen
When the UK left the EU, we learned how fragile some systems actually were. Access to European data systems was not automatic. It depended on agreements. Once we stepped outside the Schengen legal framework, we had to rebuild cooperation through new arrangements.
The key lesson was this: goodwill is not enough. Intelligence sharing depends on legal structures and political stability.
If transatlantic relations become more transactional, as suggested in the November 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy 2025-National-Security-Strategy, then partnerships may increasingly be judged on immediate national benefit. The strategy emphasises sovereignty, national interest, and burden-sharing. That does not mean intelligence ties will collapse. But it does mean they could become more conditional.
Crime and terrorism will exploit seams
Transnational crime groups and hostile actors are quick to spot weaknesses. They look for gaps between systems. They understand when political friction creates operational delay.
We saw this very clearly with EncroChat. Criminal networks across Europe used encrypted devices believing they were untouchable. It was only through close international intelligence cooperation that law enforcement managed to infiltrate the platform and disrupt serious organised crime on a massive scale. The success of that operation depended on trust, speed, and legal alignment between countries.
If those alignments weaken, organised crime will adapt just as quickly. They will move communications platforms, change routes, and exploit legal grey areas. Terrorist networks do the same. They study where data sharing slows down and where oversight differs between jurisdictions. In my experience, criminals adapt faster than policy does.
The UK has spent years ensuring that post-Brexit intelligence arrangements remain strong. But if we now enter a period where the U.S. and parts of Europe are openly divided — particularly over strategic issues like Greenland — the UK may be forced into careful diplomatic balancing. And balancing takes effort.
What the UK needs to do
Over the next ten years, the UK will need to protect three things.
First, the strength of the Five Eyes relationship. That remains the backbone of UK–U.S. intelligence cooperation.
Second, workable relationships with European partners. Geography has not changed. Threats cross the Channel every day.
Third, legal clarity. Intelligence sharing must remain underpinned by robust agreements that survive political disagreement.
Final Thoughts
When I started policing, intelligence was slower but simpler. Today it is faster, smarter — and more dependent on international stability. If the “rules-based order” is under strain, intelligence systems will feel that strain too.
The UK cannot afford weakened cooperation with either the U.S. or Europe. But in a world where the U.S. signals aspirations that challenge European sovereignty — such as moves toward Greenland — we may find ourselves navigating uncomfortable diplomatic waters. The threats we face do not pause for geopolitics.
So while politicians debate sovereignty and strategy, those of us concerned with crime and counter-terrorism must ensure that the bridges stay standing.
Because once intelligence cooperation weakens, rebuilding it is far harder than maintaining it.
Ken Kirwan: Eyes on Crime Editor
Author’s note: between 2018 and 2020, I was a key member of the international crime coordination centre (ICCC) supporting the development of post-Brexit intelligence and information-sharing arrangements between the UK and international partners.
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